ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION

This article closely examines Lee v. Macon County Board of
case that grew from a challenge to school segregation in a small Alabama county and became the vehicle for statewide school desegregation. In its examination, the article, following the suggestion of Schultz & Gottlieb (1996: 90) , deviates from the methodology used by Rosenberg and examines the role of the judiciary in school desegregation at the micro level. It explores the question whether and how lower court enforcement of a Supreme Court decision such as Brown v.
Board of Education may bring about social change even though, "in a government in which [powers] are separated from each other, the judiciary… will always be the least dangerous…." (Hamilton 1788) . To what extent are the courts constrained by "the inability to develop appropriate policies and … lack of powers of implementation?" (Rosenberg 2008:10) .
Rosenberg lists three constraints on the ability of courts to produce meaningful social change: the limited nature of constitutional rights, the lack of judicial independence, and the judiciary's lack of powers of implementation. The second constraint, he says, can be overcome only with support from Congress and the executive, and the third only with support from some citizens or low levels of opposition from all citizens. (Rosenberg, (35) (36) To those who seek instruments of social change, the question, "Can courts bring about social change?" is the wrong question. As McCann (1994:136) demonstrates, social change depends upon the confluence of several forces.
Opponents of the racial caste system engaged in a multi-pronged attack in which the courts were an essential element. Litigation, pressure on the executive branch, lobbying Congress for legislation, marches, boycotts, sit-ins, Freedom Rides, and voter registration campaigns were the tools. The courts enabled many of these methods, even encouraging some of them, and they began enforcing Brown before Congress' landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 empowered federal agencies to enforce school desegregation. John Doar succinctly summarized: "Look, if you're going to bring about a big cultural change in this country, you need the three branches of the federal government to work together…" (Landsberg 2013:304; see also, Cummings (2013:185) , McCann (1992:728) , and Epstein & Walker (2007:123) ).
Examining litigation for social change through the lens of Lee v. Macon in its early phases reveals the complex interaction of the district court, the proponents of social change, the state and local governments, the federal executive branch, and the Congress. This article covers the first two years of the case, [1963] [1964] [1965] Addressing the issues through this concrete case provides a perspective missing in Rosenberg's analysis. As Vecera recently demonstrated, close examination of specific elements may be more informative than reliance on gross measures such as polling. Moreover, Rosenberg's discussion of Brown's influence on public opinion presents quantitative but not qualitative data. He does not consider the extent to which Brown led opinion leaders to, as Vecera puts it, adopt "a rhetoric that emphasized constitutional claims…." (Vecera, 235) Change began with Brown's holding that the separate but equal doctrine in the public schools is unconstitutional. However, articulation of a new legal norm does not necessarily change behavior. One may expect resistance, especially where the legal norm differs from the social or religious norm. As points out, the courts' ability to bring about change is relatively high when they need not rely on other political actors to implement their decisions; school desegregation, however, could be achieved only through elected school boards carrying out the Brown mandate. Given the political resistance to Brown in the Deep South, how could the courts ensure compliance? Macon County's experience shows that private plaintiffs, determined to secure equal education under Brown, were able to gain relief from a skilled federal judge, who enlisted the willing aid of the U.S. Attorney General at a time when help from Congress was but a dim hope and the Alabama state government was an implacable foe.
This study accepts Rosenberg's model of constrained and dynamic court, but suggests that it is not sufficient to examine the question at the macro level, as Rosenberg does, but that deeper understanding comes from adding analysis at the micro level. Rather than relying on regional and national desegregation statistics, review of news coverage, and polling data, the study examines experience in one school system. It considers the tools available to the seekers of social change in Macon County and explains how they were deployed and how the trial court expanded those tools. This method of analysis helps put the national statistics and polling data into perspective.
MACON COUNTY, THE SCHOOL BOARD, AND AFRICAN
AMERICANS
The Birmingham News once characterized Macon County as the "guinea pig of race relations in Alabama" (Taylor 1951 In 1934 Charles Johnson, a noted African American sociologist, had written about the county: "It has been impossible to escape the force of tradition, as represented in the customs established under the institution of slavery, and adhered to by the white population in their relation to the Negroes, and by the Negroes in relation to themselves" (Johnson 1934:208) . By the 1930's, though, even rural Macon County African Americans were beginning to stress the value of education (Johnson 1934:134, 156) .
Before Brown, Macon County African Americans faced the long-standing Alabama law requiring segregation of the races, "firmly entrenched in American constitutional law." (Legislative Reference Service 1954). And they faced a voter registration law that allowed systematic discrimination against African American applicants to vote; a hostile white political ruling class; and limited options for redress. State courts were "places in which the Negro could count on little consideration…" (Cash 1941:412) . The education system for African Americans was based on the perception of the ruling whites that "Negro education … will enable us to make sure that he acquires no dangerous notions, to control what he is taught, to make sure that he is educated to fit into, and to stay in, his place" (Cash 1941:181-83) . Absent Brown, the South was highly unlikely to desegregate voluntarily, given its "all too great attachment to racial values and a tendency to justify cruelty and injustice in the name of those values…" (Cash 1941:426) .
In 1950 the leading Macon County civil rights organization, the Tuskegee Civic Association (TCA), published a chart showing that per pupil expenditure for Macon County whites was $255.02 compared with $88.07 per black student, a threefold disparity. Capital outlay per pupil reflected an even greater, tenfold disparity: $85.59 per white and $7.93 per black (Tuskegee Civic Association 1950). The following January an African American mother asked the county superintendent to either provide her son at the black high school in Tuskegee a geometry course or allow him to take that one course at the nearby all-white Tuskegee High School. Dr. C.G. Gomillion, for the TCA, then sent a petition that told the school board that its actions denied black children "equal protection of the laws secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States" (Cobb 1951; Norrell 1985:81) .
Although Macon County African Americans embraced the importance of Supreme Court decisions "trying to implement the value of equality of opportunity, and to rectify the unfortunate decision of the 1896 Court" (Gomillion 1959 ), the first priority of the TCA was to secure the right to vote. Not until newspaper asking the school board to consider desegregation, and other appeals followed (Guzman 1984:150-51 (Buford 1959) . As Peltason (1961:58) noted in the time period, "Segregationists know that if they can keep Negroes from suing in federal courts they can continue to operate segregated institutions. They have not hesitated therefore to intimidate Negro plaintiffs."
THE DESEGREGATION CASE AND THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
One major constraint on the courts is that they act only in response to litigation. Until a case is filed, the court is powerless. In 1963, any suit to desegregate would have to come from private plaintiffs, not the United States government. Had the United States brought a criminal prosecution for willful violation of constitutional rights a predominantly white Alabama jury, would not have convicted (Carr 1947:138-146) . Congress had refused to authorize the U.S.
Attorney General to bring civil suits to remedy denials of constitutional rights (Peltason 1961:54-55 Johnson, a former United States Attorney, had developed respect for the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, and within days of the filing he notified the Division that he planned to ask the United States to participate as amicus curiae with the rights of a party (Marshall 1963) .
That district courts may summon the help of a litigating amicus suggests that the institutional weaknesses of the "constrained court" can be overcome by a determined and imaginative judge, even in a case raising "unpopular lateral issues," where implementation of court orders depends on cooperation from officials outside the court system (Rosenberg 2008:10; Hall 2011:17,127) . True, the government may always decline the invitation to participate, but precedent and the normal commitment of the executive to maintain law and order generally lead the government to participate as requested (Brownell 1956 ).
Although the defendants filed a perfunctory motion asking the court to dismiss the Macon County desegregation case, the law was clear and the facts of segregation indisputable. When the suit was filed in 1963, no school in the state enrolled white and black students. Most Alabama whites were dead set against desegregation. The new Governor, George C. Wallace, had declared at his inauguration in January of 1963, "I draw the line in the dust and toss the gauntlet before the feet of tyranny and I say segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever." He gave assurance that he would fight the federal government and the federal courts: "That from this day, from this hour . . . from this minute . . . we give the word of a race of honor that we will tolerate their boot in our face no longer . . . . and let those certain judges put that in their opium pipes of power and smoke it for what it is worth" (Wallace 1963a ).
As the fall semester drew nearer, events unfolded at an increasingly intense pace. The actors included the plaintiffs, the school board, the United States through its lawyers, the Macon Countians who wanted to fight desegregation, the Governor, and Judge Johnson. Johnson then met privately with Norman, and told him that Governor Wallace was likely to interfere with desegregation at one of the four school districts that were to desegregate that fall and that the Justice Department needed to "keep our intelligence forces going so that we will be really ready if there is any trouble."
He also wanted the Justice Department to stay in close contact with the Macon County superintendent, to help him resist pressure to violate the order (Norman 1963 ).
After Judge Johnson entered the desegregation order, John Doar, second in command of the Civil Rights Division, wrote a memorandum that reflected an increasingly proactive role of the United States. He proposed to return to Tuskegee the next morning "to go over the list of applicants to determine that the Board has been fair with respect to acceptance and rejection." He acknowledged that "this puts the Department of Justice deep into the supervision of the school system prior to any objections by the Negroes," and he noted that this "takes the burden of policing the school board off the back of the Negroes' attorney."
Another reason for taking on this role was "This is what Judge Johnson wants."
He deemed the deep involvement of the Department of Justice as necessary, because the plaintiffs, court, and school board "face tremendous problems in working out a satisfactory school system in Macon County (5 Negro school children for every one white child)." Finally, Doar argued, "The experience that we gain here will be useful in counseling with the Board and the Court on a feasible school desegregation plan" (Doar 1963 ).
This memo reflects optimism, hard-nosed analysis of the situation, and a view that Department of Justice participation in this case must go beyond enforcing court orders and must reach into shaping the relief in the case. The rest of the memorandum, devoted to security issues and community relations, showed that Doar was creating close relationships with both the black and white leadership, including local law enforcement. The Department of Justice was now acting more like a party than an amicus.
Twenty-seven African Americans applied to attend white schools, the Tuskegee News reported. The story noted that observers believed the pupil placement law could not be used to maintain segregation (Tuskegee News 1963).
The school board, after consulting with the Tuskegee mayor and some city council members, unanimously voted to comply with the order. The day after the March on Washington, the Board approved the enrollment of thirteen of the fortyeight African American students who had by then applied to attend Tuskegee High School, where 550 white students were enrolled. The Superintendent of Schools, C.A. Pruitt, did "not anticipate any trouble," and, he added, local police could take care of any problems that might occur (Harris 1963) .
After the school board selected the thirteen African American students to attend Tuskegee High School, the students met regularly with attorney Fred Gray and community leaders to prepare themselves for integration. They were aware of what had happened in Little Rock six years earlier, and the grownups at the meeting "would tell us things like you can expect to be hollered at, you can expect to maybe even be spit upon. But you are to take no action." Then, as Willie Wyatt recounts, John Doar introduced himself and explained "that the Justice Department is there for our benefit, to look out for us, for our security."
Wyatt was impressed that the federal government was taking an interest in the case and him as an individual (Bagley 2012 ).
The Department of Justice thus viewed its role in the case as extending well beyond the giving of advice or presenting evidence in court. While the students were not in an attorney-client relationship with the Department of Justice, its lawyers took on a responsibility to insure that the students' rights were protected.
THE STATE'S ROLE
The Governor had promised "segregation forever." His predecessor, John Patterson, had successfully followed a strategy of delay, but that strategy had begun to run its course. surround Tuskegee High School and prevent students from entering. Although there were some calls for court action against the Governor, no party filed any papers at this point. The delay was only for a week, and the closing affected students of both races, so the interference with desegregation was minimal.
However, another development would gravely endanger desegregation: a group of white parents set about to organize a white private school in Macon County, with full support from Governor Wallace and the promise of tuition grants from the state (Wallace 1963b) .
After the one week delay, Governor Wallace issued three executive orders stating that no child shall be permitted to integrate the schools in Macon County, Birmingham, and Mobile. Unaware of the orders, the black students who had been admitted to Tuskegee High School met once again at the office of school superintendent Pruitt, who was "as cordial as he could be." A black driver then drove them in a school bus to the school, where they were met by State Troopers.
One Trooper boarded the bus, read the Governor's proclamation to the students and gave each a copy (Bagley 2012) . At Tuskegee High School, Department of Justice attorney John Martin observed white children enter the school and saw the bus carrying African American children drive away after state troopers boarded it.
He reported that there were no hostile crowds around the school, just newsmen (Martin 1963 [The United States] is suffering and, unless an injunction is entered, will continue to suffer immediate and irreparable injury as a consequence of the impairment of its judicial process, the obstruction of the due administration of justice in its courts, and the deprivation of rights under the Constitution and laws of the United States (U.S. v. Wallace 1963).
Wallace's lawyer, John Kohn, lacking stronger arguments, argued that the Fourteenth Amendment, "conceived in hate, born in the aftermath of war, and carried through at the point of the bayonet," was not valid (Bass 1993:211) and an injunction was in any event not necessary.
The court enjoined the Governor and his subordinates from interfering with school desegregation that had been ordered for that fall, and it ordered that they maintain law and order so that desegregation could move forward. The order more generally enjoined them from "[p]reventing, attempting to prevent, or interfering with the exercise of rights or the performance of duties under" the school desegregation orders of the three United States District Courts in Macon County, Mobile, and Birmingham (U.S. v. Wallace 1963) . This order became the first step toward the eventual statewide injunction that would come four years later. More immediately, this time there was no stand in the schoolhouse door, and the black students began attending Tuskegee High School.
ANALYSIS OF THE 1963 EVENTS
This first phase reflects the complexity of the question of Brown's impact on meeting the goals of seekers of social change. The African Americans of Macon County had a thirst for education, fed at least in part by the legacy of Booker T. Washington. Their desire for equal education preceded Brown v.
Board, but they viewed that decision as opening new opportunities. They wanted equal educational opportunity, and they saw desegregation as a route to achieve that end. In this 80% black county, face time with white children was at most a secondary goal. Practically, this meant that the seekers of social change had to make an initial choice, whether to use their limited resources to pursue school desegregation or to pursue voting rights. They lacked resources to pursue both simultaneously, and they chose voting rights, perhaps forced to do so by the Alabama legislature's gerrymander to exclude them from the municipal boundaries of Tuskegee, but also because they did view the vote as the right that would help secure other rights.
Next, having secured voting rights, the TCA asked the school board to desegregate; when the board failed to respond, TCA devoted its limited resources to employ Fred Gray to bring suit. The different actors held a variety of goals. The TCA's goals were focused on equal educational opportunities. Then Judge Johnson brought in the Department of Justice, which pursued at a minimum a law enforcement goal but perhaps also a desegregation goal. Judge Johnson was guided by the Supreme Court's decisions in Brown and subsequent cases. Once it was sued, the school district acquiesced in a desegregation order, perhaps influenced by the growing black vote or perhaps believing that compliance would be the best route to holding the school system together. Governor Wallace provided yet another perspective, one that was popular with most of the white electorate in Macon County and throughout most of Alabama: resistance. All the actors were aware that the ultimate target was the racial caste system.
MORE INTERFERENCE, PRIVATE SCHOOLS, AND TRANSITION TO STATEWIDE CASE
Having failed to halt the desegregation of the Macon County schools, Governor Wallace and his allies sought to undermine desegregation by creating a new school, private in theory but state-supported, for the white children of Macon interference by the Governor and state school officials, all assumed that courtordered desegregation would proceed school system-by-school system rather than statewide. What in retrospect seems quite simple --the absorption of a few more students into a white school --was at the time a major, headline-grabbing issue.
The thirteen black students at Tuskegee High School soon found themselves in all-black classes, as their white classmates of high school age transferred either to the other two white high schools in Macon County or to the newly-formed private segregation academy, the Macon Academy. Nonetheless, they felt that the teachers at Tuskegee High gave them a good education. In 1964 Fred Gray had not just sought relief for Macon County, nor did he confine himself to challenging the tuition grant statute. He relates that the "realization hit me like the burning bush speaking to Moses," that if the Governor had the power to close a school in Macon County, "he should be compelled to use that same power to integrate all of the school systems in Alabama which were not already then under court order" (Gray 1995:213) . So Gray added the Governor and other state officials as defendants and asked the court for statewide relief. The United States supported most of Gray's motion but took a different approach to statewide relief, asking only that the court "enjoin the State Board to perform its constitutional obligation, within the limits of its state authority, to accomplish or facilitate the elimination of racial discrimination from the state school system." However, the United States expressed no view on the extent of the Board's authority --a partial departure from the private plaintiffs' position (Barrett 1964) .
Alabama Attorney General Richmond Flowers argued that the Macon County
Board had complied with the court's orders and that the plaintiffs had no right to expand the case beyond Macon County (Flowers 1964:Motion) .
After a February 1964 hearing on Gray's motion, the Department had filed a lengthy brief urging entry of a preliminary injunction running against both the Macon County officials and the defendant Alabama officials; asking that the grants-in-aid statute be declared unconstitutional as applied to grants for students at racially segregated schools, that the state officials be enjoined from interfering with desegregation in school systems in Alabama and be ordered to take affirmative steps to eliminate the dual school system in Alabama, "based not only upon the assumption and usurpation of authority by these officials but also upon the legal authority that they presently possess under Alabama law;" and that the Alabama Pupil Placement Law be declared unconstitutional "until the dual system of schools in Alabama is eliminated." The brief described the evidence of the state's official policy of segregation, which created its dual system; the general control and supervision of the state superintendent and board over the local school Wallace persisted in his actions, the injunction would also run against him as Governor. The court also held that the state tuition grant law could not be used to finance the Macon Academy but it did not declare the statute unconstitutional in all circumstances. Plaintiffs had also challenged Alabama's pupil placement law as unconstitutional. While agreeing that the school authorities had applied the law in a discriminatory manner in Macon County, the court declined to hold it unconstitutional "at this time," instead enjoining discrimination in the application of the law (Lee v. Macon County Board of Education 1964:756) The novel and most consequential question before the court was whether to grant the plaintiffs' plea that it "order desegregation of all the public schools of the State of Alabama at the elementary and secondary level based upon the assumption or usurpation of authority by the Governor, the State Superintendent of Education and the State Board of Education…." The Governor argued that the local plaintiffs had no viable claim with respect to school systems outside Macon County. Here, the order making the United States not only amicus curiae but also a party became crucial. The court said that the United States was pursuing "the public interest in the due administration of justice in the Federal courts." Therefore, "the contention of the defendants that relief must be restricted only to these Negro plaintiffs borders on the frivolous." Although it found that the State defendants' actions "place them in an extremely weak position," the court declined to enter the statewide desegregation order, saying instead:
For the present time this Court will proceed upon the assumption that the Governor, the State Superintendent of Education, and the State Board of Education will comply in good faith with the injunction of this Court prohibiting such interference with the local city and county school boards, and through the exercise of considerable judicial restraint, no statewide desegregation order will be ordered at this time. (Lee v. Macon 1964:756) .
The court thus simultaneously showed restraint and deference to the State officials while also enjoining them from interfering with school desegregation anywhere in the State (Lee v. Macon 1964) . To underscore that it would be holding the State officials' feet to the fire, the court also required that they use whatever control and supervision they exercised over local school districts "in such a manner as to promote and encourage the elimination of racial discrimination in the public schools…" (Lee v. Macon 1964:July 13 decree). That part of the story must await another day.
THE DISTRICT COURT AS AN AGENT OF SOCIAL CHANGE
The story of Lee v. Macon shows that seekers of social change may achieve it through court action. The change may take longer than wished. It may not take the precise shape envisioned at the outset. Constraints on the courts do mean that they cannot create social change by themselves. And the norms that the Social change is particularly difficult when prior court decisions have validated deeply embedded social practices in society and have created structural as well as cultural impediments to change. Southern whites knew that dismantling the dual school systems would upset the racial caste system. That system had ensured white dominance in education, in employment, in politics, and in social and economic affairs. As Judge Frank Easterbrook explained an analogous cultural phenomenon:
People taught from birth that black people are fit only for slavery rarely rebelled against that creed; beliefs coupled with the selfinterest of the masters established a social structure that inflicted great harm while enduring for centuries (American Booksellers v. Hudnut 1985:329) . Rosenberg 2008:50-51; Klarman 2004:363) . Court's ability to advance social change considered chiefly through statistical analysis of the influences on the court (e.g. Dahl 1957; Segal 1997; Epstein et al. 2001; Owens 2010) .
One should discount the courts as agents of social change if the evidence shows that the change would have taken place with or without judicial intervention or if one could show that change did not take place. So long as Plessy stood as both a symbol and a precedent, it was extremely unlikely that either Congress or the Southern States would bring about desegregation. This helps explain why neither the state nor federal governments moved to desegregate the schools. Nor did any school districts sue the state to overturn the segregation laws. Some northern states did pass civil rights legislation, and President Truman desegregated the armed forces (Kluger 1975:759; Klarman 2004:364) . But against those who wished for school desegregation, Plessy was repeatedly cited not only to support the legality of state segregation laws, but also as a constitutional barrier to federal action. While Congress and the Executive need not have court approval to act within the scope of their authority, Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment would not include the power to require desegregation so long as Plessy stood.
Separation of powers doctrine applies differently to court decisions interpreting the Constitution and those interpreting statutes. Congress may overturn the latter; it may not overturn the former, except by constitutional amendment or indirect means such as influencing the courts through its exercise of the advise-and-consent oversight of judicial nominees or adjusting the budget of the courts (Epstein & Walker 2007:58-60, 123-124; Harvey & Friedman 2009:575-576; Eskridge 1991:679-680; City of Boerne v. Flores 1997:519) .
Drawing on the Spending Power, Congress could have imposed desegregation as a condition to receiving federal funds. However, it consistently rejected the Powell amendment, which would have forbidden race discrimination by school systems receiving federal funds (Rosenberg 2008:122-23 and societal reliance on the existing structure created a further barrier to change (Golden 1959:169-70) . In the words of President Eisenhower (1955) The constraints on the courts did slow down judicial action, as prospective plaintiffs struggled to find lawyers, decisions of reluctant trial courts went through the appeals process, and determined defendants used every possible tool to delay.
But in the fullness of time, the lower courts did enforce Brown and the school districts did comply. A final constraint here was the culture of the white minority.
If the objective of the plaintiffs was to end racial isolation, the flight of whites to private schools did defeat meeting that goal in Macon County, at least for a time. 
CONCLUSION
Brown and its aftermath show the complexity of social change, especially when change meets strong resistance. But this history also suggests that the courts often have the competence to deal with that complexity and to lead the way for other essential actors. Yet one should also note the negative side: The courts can be not only agents of change but also agents of the status quo. They can validate laws that entrench the status quo, as they did in the years after Plessy.
And they can effectively block or at least delay performance of the other branches' reform agenda. Opponents of social change often mobilize to challenge it in the courts.
In short, if we speak of the "constrained court," we must also speak of the "constrained executive" and the "constrained Congress" (Schultz & Gottlieb, 1996 :67) and we must acknowledge that those judges who are willing to enforce unpopular laws wield many tools of a dynamic court. Before Brown, school segregation was an entrenched social custom that could be undone only through state legislation, a most unlikely avenue for change, in light of the entrenched racial caste system. Brown transformed school segregation into an issue of whether the Constitution would be enforced. Ultimately, Brown succeeded because it lent formal legitimacy to the opponents of school segregation, empowered the lower courts and the executive and put pressure on the Congress.
Lacking authority from Congress to bring school desegregation cases, the
